A public accountability letter by Ekewaka Lono.
Related open investigation: This event is one component of the ongoing 2015–2022 sequence analysis. See The Information Trail: Open Questions from 2015–2022.
The prosecution arose from my November 2015 encounter with tax official Young Kwak. His accusation about what I said was false. The July 2017 trial ended in a hung jury. The State did not retry the case, and I later obtained an expungement.
Vincent Kanemoto stood before the jury and asked them to imagine a gun that was not in evidence. I watched him make a pistol with his hands and direct it toward the jurors. I heard him close with these words:
“There was no gun in this trial. But what if there was? Convict him. I rest my case.”
The quotation gives his words in substance; the transcript can establish the exact wording.
In a later encounter at Glazer’s, which I place in summer 2019, I asked Kanemoto why he had made the mock-pistol argument. He denied doing it. Mr. Kanemoto: why the imaginary gun, why your denial, and what, if anything, did James Yuen communicate to you about my North Jersey childhood associations during trial preparation?
James Yuen was present when an investigator invoked my North Jersey childhood associations in November 2015. I later personally observed Yuen working directly with Kanemoto in trial preparation. Before the Tax Office gives the earlier chronology. What Yuen conveyed to Kanemoto remains unresolved. Young Kwak later gave the grand jury an account of the booth encounter that I directly dispute.
My inference is that the closing argument exploited the adverse framing introduced during the investigator encounter. That is the connection I am drawing, and the reasons for it belong in public. I witnessed no agreement among the participants; the theory concerns use of the narrative.
November 2015: The Investigator Encounter
The tax-office confrontation preceded the investigator encounter. My words were about exposing what was happening and telling everyone. His later accusation about what I said was false.
Later that November, Yuen stood beside a man identified to me as a New Jersey State Police organized-crime task-force investigator during an attempted interrogation. The man invoked my childhood associates and their organized-crime associations. I understood his warning as a threat of invasive investigation and humiliation. Before the Tax Office records his words and the encounter.
I later personally observed Yuen working directly with Kanemoto in trial preparation. Yuen was present at both points. What he conveyed and whether it influenced the closing remain unresolved. Briefing a prosecutor can be routine; their contact alone does not establish misconduct. Childhood acquaintance supplies no evidence of participation in others’ offenses or culpability in an unrelated matter.
Agency and prosecution records could identify the investigator, his assignment, the purpose of the questioning, any interview notes or recording, and what Yuen conveyed during preparation.
Kwak’s Grand-Jury Account
Young Kwak made a false accusation about what I said during the encounter and presented it to the grand jury. His grand-jury account came after the November 2015 investigator encounter. The present record does not establish when he first made the same accusation. The earliest timestamped account could establish whether the accusation preceded the investigator encounter.
I heard the accusation in the grand-jury recording. I was present for the tax-office interaction and know what I said. I was not present in the grand-jury room; the recording is how I learned what he told the grand jury. The recording and a transcript should be made available for comparison with the underlying encounter. They have not been independently authenticated or published with this letter.
The present record does not establish what Kwak believed about the accuracy of his account. I suspect Yuen and the purported investigator influenced how the accusation was later adopted, reinforced, escalated, or framed. That is my inference about development, not a conversation or instruction I witnessed. If records show Kwak made the same accusation before the investigator encounter, that encounter cannot explain its origin. Interview notes, the earliest complaint record, communications, witness-preparation materials, and the testimony are the records that can test the chronology and the influence theory.
My criticism is that the accusation moved through the grand-jury process while my account of the underlying exchange and surrounding pressure remained outside the public frame. The testimony and exhibits should establish precisely what each witness said and what evidence the grand jury received.
The accountability issue begins before closing argument. What background framing, if any, entered the investigation? What did Kwak actually testify to? What information reached the prosecution? And what evidentiary basis, if any, connected prior background information to the encounter the state was presenting?
What Did Not Reach the Trial Jury
Kwak’s accusation was presented to the grand jury that indicted me. The prosecution also possessed recordings of my distressed reaction to the tax-office encounter. I had already denied the accusation to counsel. At trial, the State did not put it before the jury or play those recordings. Kwak instead gave the form account examined below.
The accusation reached grand jurors and officials through a proceeding governed by grand-jury secrecy.1 It was not put before the trial jury in that form, where I could deny it and Kwak could be cross-examined about it. Whether the separate recordings of my distress were also presented to the grand jury remains a question for its transcript and exhibit list.
My inference is that the accusation and recordings could have damaged the State’s case once contested. Hearing my distress could have prompted the jury to ask what happened inside the booth and to question Kwak’s benign account. The State’s choices are consistent with an assessment that the material would hurt its case; they do not establish the prosecution’s actual reason for omitting it.
Prosecutors need not repeat every item of charging evidence at trial. The legal question at trial is whether they knew Kwak’s form testimony was false or materially misleading and left it uncorrected.2 Comparing the grand-jury and trial transcripts, exhibits, recordings, and preparation files could establish what changed and what prosecutors knew. Communications with defense counsel could show whether and when my denial reached the State. The Defense Table Went Quiet follows counsel’s handling of Kwak’s testimony and the scene evidence through the decisions after chambers.
The Imaginary Gun
At trial, I watched Kanemoto form a mock pistol with his hands and point it toward the jury while asking the jurors to imagine a gun that was not in the case.
The gesture suggested armed danger without evidence. Kanemoto had the authority of the state behind him. My childhood associations with people later convicted of crimes were already part of the investigative background I had encountered. In my interpretation, the gun gesture gave that background a visual form.
My inference: the closing argument exploited the earlier adverse framing, which Yuen may have conveyed to Kanemoto. The questions are whether Yuen passed along that background and whether it influenced the closing. I observed Yuen at both points in the sequence; I do not claim to have heard their private briefings or an instruction to use the gesture.
An appeal to fear based on something outside the evidence deserves scrutiny regardless of where the idea came from.
The risk went beyond the image of a gun. A juror could take the gesture to mean I was dangerous, despite the lack of evidence of a weapon, or assume the prosecutor knew something that justified linking me to one. I cannot say what any individual juror thought.
The defense the jury heard also matters when assessing prejudice. In my assessment, counsel did not meaningfully test Kwak’s form account or the State’s depiction of the booth. The defense did not use the photograph of the actual booth I had requested. The Defense Table Went Quiet examines those choices, the resulting trial record, and counsel’s response to the prosecutor’s closing.
The hung jury does not show that the argument was harmless. It tells us only that the jurors could not agree, not how any juror understood the gun imagery or how deliberations might have gone without it.
The Judge Called Chambers
The presiding judge appeared openly angry immediately after the episode, called a recess, and brought the matter into chambers.
My recollection is that the judge also instructed the jury to disregard the mock-pistol episode. The transcript should establish the wording and timing.
The transcript, minutes, any courtroom recording, counsel’s notes, and other witnesses could independently confirm or contradict my account of the recess, the call to chambers, and what followed. They could also establish any objection, reference to the conference, jury instruction, and statements afterward. What happened in chambers? Did anyone describe the gesture, and was any remedy recorded?
Hawaiʻi courts generally presume jurors follow the judge’s instructions. In State v. Klinge (2000), the court found that an improper remark did not deny a fair trial after considering its nature, the prompt response, and the strength of the evidence.3 An instruction must be assessed in context. State v. Tuua (2011) weighs the nature of the conduct, the promptness of a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness of the evidence. It rejected reliance on general instructions in a close case turning on witness credibility.4
Here, the record needs to show whether the instruction addressed both the gesture and the invitation to imagine a gun outside the evidence, and how promptly it came. Kwak’s disputed account and the evidence concerning the booth also matter to that assessment. These cases reviewed convictions. My trial produced none, so their factors guide this review of the court’s response.
A transcript can establish the gun language without capturing the gesture. Any available recording, contemporaneous notes, or accounts from people who were present could independently confirm what Kanemoto did with his hands.
Any accounts of chambers could establish whether the closing was discussed and what remedies were considered. The Defense Table Went Quiet examines when the petty-misdemeanor offer became available and what counsel explained afterward.
What My Trial Counsel Did
I testified at the July 2017 trial but omitted the Hartmann episode after Retained Trial Counsel advised against including it. He also continued pressing a plea while the jury deliberated, despite my refusals. The Defense Table Went Quiet holds the account of his opening, advice, chambers, preservation choices, and plea advocacy. This article examines Kwak’s testimony, the diagram, and Kanemoto’s closing.
The Witness Account, the Diagram, and the Booth
The form testimony
Inside the tax-office booth, Kwak demanded about seven times what I owed. I told him what I owed, and the final calculation came in just below the figure I had given him. He threatened that leaving would mean dealing with someone who “wasn’t nice.” The transcript, exhibits, preparation records, and defense file are the independent comparison records.
At trial, Young Kwak testified, in substance, that he merely told me which form to fill out. That did not happen. His account was false. I immediately told Retained Trial Counsel, in substance, that Kwak had lied and that the event he described never happened. Counsel answered, in substance, that the statement was not material and was not perjury.
James Yuen handled the tax investigation; Vincent Kanemoto prosecuted. I personally observed Yuen working directly with Kanemoto in trial preparation. Kwak also participated in trial preparation with Yuen and Kanemoto. Kwak’s form account sounded rehearsed to me. The preparation notes and prior statements must establish what each participant supplied, when the form detail first appeared, and whether it was present before preparation.
Kwak’s false form description presented him as a routine official giving ordinary instructions. It omitted the pressure he had applied and gave the jury a false account against which to judge my reaction. The exact words, their first recorded appearance, and their consistency with Kwak’s earliest complaint, investigator interviews, grand-jury account, and preparation statements are distinct questions.
Materiality, false swearing, and witness credibility
The July 2017 statutory text distinguishes felony perjury from lesser sworn-falsification offenses. HRS § 710-1000 defines material falsity by its capacity to affect a proceeding’s course or outcome and assigns materiality to the court as a question of law. Section 710-1060 requires that determination for a felony-perjury conviction. Section 710-1061(1)(a) separately makes a false sworn statement in an official proceeding a misdemeanor when the speaker does not believe it true, without that materiality requirement. The commentary explains that even seemingly distant false answers can obstruct credibility testing and the route to relevant truth.5
Counsel’s answer did not resolve my objection. I was identifying a statement about an encounter I experienced that never happened. The criminal classification, the witness’s credibility, and the impression given to the jury each required attention. Whether the statement affected the proceeding requires its trial context, not its dismissal as a minor form detail.
In Birano v. State (2018), the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court explained that the prosecution’s duty to correct known false testimony extends to credibility-related falsehoods and materially misleading testimony. The court gave that guidance after resolving the case on nondisclosure grounds; it did not separately decide that the correction failure justified relief.2
Did Kwak’s earlier reports, Yuen’s interviews, or prosecution preparation materials contain information inconsistent with the testimony? Those records could establish what Yuen and Kanemoto had been told. My trial ended in a hung jury and no retrial. The authority supplies the trial-integrity standard, rather than a post-conviction remedy in this case.
Qualifying inconsistent grand-jury testimony could also have been used to challenge Kwak and, under HRE 802.1(1), as substantive evidence. That requires a genuine inconsistency, cross-examination about the subject, and the foundation specified in Rule 613(b). A detail missing from an earlier account is not automatically inconsistent; the questions asked and the completeness of that account matter.6
The physical booth and the State’s diagram
The booth was tiny, enclosed, and claustrophobic. I arrived sleep-deprived and nervous about the tax problem. After the door closed, Kwak began verbally attacking and aggressively pressuring me.
Before trial, I asked Retained Trial Counsel to obtain a photograph of the actual booth and use it as an exhibit. He did not obtain or use that photograph. The prosecution used a diagram that made the space appear substantially larger and more comfortable than it was. It misrepresented how small and enclosed the booth was. The requested photograph would have supplied a direct comparison with the State’s depiction.
HRE Rule 901(a) requires authentication sufficient to support what the proponent claims an item is. Its commentary treats maps, charts, sketches, models, and replicas as representations requiring foundation testimony or other proof of substantial accuracy.7 HRE Rule 403 separately permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury.8
State v. Kwong (2021) provides a foundation analogy. The court declined judicial notice of an annotated map offered on appeal: vehicle positions lacked foundation, lane widths had not been established at trial, and no scale verified the measurements. That appellate setting differs from admission of a trial diagram; the useful principle is that spatial claims need evidentiary support.9
The exhibit list and trial record must identify whether the diagram was admitted evidence or a demonstrative aid, what it purported to depict, its creator and creation date, its authenticating witness, its scale or not-to-scale label, and its dimensions and source measurements. A schematic’s stated purpose matters. Did the depiction accurately represent the booth for its stated purpose? Could it have misled the jury about the booth’s size and enclosed layout?
The verbal account and the visual depiction pointed in the same direction: routine instructions in a spacious setting. I faced aggressive pressure in a tiny closed booth. The trial record and scene records allow that difference to be tested directly. The Defense Table Went Quiet audits counsel’s response to my immediate objection and prior photograph request.
Questions for Kwak, Yuen, and Kanemoto
- What was the source of the form detail, and when does it first appear in Kwak’s recorded account?
- Did Kwak give that description before trial preparation? What preparation occurred among Kwak, Yuen, and Kanemoto?
- Who created the booth diagram, and what observations, measurements, or plans supported its dimensions?
- Was the diagram admitted as evidence or displayed as a demonstrative, and was it presented as accurate or not to scale?
- What information did the prosecution have about the booth’s actual dimensions and layout?
The Threat I Had Reported
Before trial, I reported the Gene and Rita Hartmann death threat to assigned counsel Audrey L.E. Stanley10. I understood the warning as pressure against my defense investigation and disclosure. The Threat Report examines that report, her response, the legal questions, and the later leave-Hawaiʻi communication.
My criticism of the prosecution’s framing is this: the Hartmann death threat was absent from my testimony, while an imaginary gun entered the state’s closing argument. Whether Kanemoto knew of the threat or acted at anyone’s direction requires separate evidence.
The earlier housing and private-information sequence is set out in Before the Tax Office. It explains the history I was carrying into the state encounter. Documentary proof of the courtroom gesture and the separate Wilson Loo matter rests on their own records and witnesses.
A Later Denial
At Glazer’s, in an encounter I place in summer 2019, I asked Kanemoto why he had made the mock-pistol argument. He denied doing it.
I infer that Kanemoto was distancing himself from what he had done in court. The judge had intervened immediately after the gesture; Kanemoto later denied making it. If he remembered the gesture and knowingly denied it, that would raise a separate question about his honesty under Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.11 The sequence does not tell me his precise motive or where the gun imagery came from.
Mr. Kanemoto:
- What evidentiary basis supported asking the jury to imagine a gun that was not in the case?
- Why did you deny making the mock-pistol argument when I confronted you at Glazer’s? If you dispute my account of that exchange, what is your account?
- What, if anything, did James Yuen communicate to you about my North Jersey childhood associates or their organized-crime associations during trial preparation?
- Who conceived the hypothetical-gun argument, and was it discussed with Yuen or anyone else before closing?
- Did any such background information influence the gun hypothetical or gesture?
The Public Standard
Hawaiʻi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g), in force during my trial,11 prohibits a lawyer from alluding at trial to a matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence. I apply that rule to the hypothetical-gun argument.
A gun hypothetical is not automatically improper because no gun was in evidence. In State v. Kupihea (1996), the prosecutor used hypothetical examples, including violent imagery, to explain recklessness and extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The court found no prejudicial error after considering the arguments in context and the jury instructions.12
In State v. Basham (2014), the court explained that a prosecutor cannot use closing argument to introduce unsupported incriminating allegations and bypass the rules of evidence. It discussed United States v. Klebig, a federal case where a physical demonstration during closing suggested facts not established at trial.13
My objection is to what Kanemoto asked the jury to do. He acknowledged that no gun was involved, pointed a mock pistol toward the jurors, and urged them to convict. In my assessment, the imaginary weapon suggested I was dangerous rather than illustrating an identified legal principle. The complete closing should establish what legal explanation, if any, preceded that appeal.
State v. Maluia (2005) distinguishes improper prosecutorial conduct from an error requiring reversal and from a violation of the professional-conduct rules.14 Calling conduct prosecutorial misconduct does not, by itself, establish a violation of Rule 3.4(g) or Rule 8.4(c).
These records could establish when events happened and what each participant did:
| Event | Evidence needed |
|---|---|
| November 2015 investigator encounter | Interview notes or recording; identity and agency-status records for the purported investigator; assignment records; interagency communications |
| Kwak’s disputed charging allegation | Grand-jury testimony; earliest timestamped complaint or accusation; interview and witness-preparation records; underlying tax-office records |
| Charging evidence omitted at trial | Grand-jury and trial transcripts; exhibit lists; distress recordings; discovery disclosures; preparation files and defense communications, if any, showing what the State knew and why it omitted the material |
| Yuen’s work with Kanemoto in trial preparation, which I personally observed | Yuen’s investigator notes and file; communications with Kanemoto; prosecution preparation notes; oral-briefing accounts and materials supplied; records or testimony establishing whether the North Jersey background was conveyed |
| Closing argument | Full closing transcript; minute entries; any courtroom recording; contemporaneous witness accounts; preparation material identifying who conceived or discussed the hypothetical-gun argument |
| Judge’s response | Recess and chambers references; exact wording and timing of the instruction I recall; recorded remedial discussion |
| Trial counsel’s opening and advice concerning my testimony about the Hartmann threat | Opening transcript; counsel notes, advice, and client communications |
| Trial counsel’s response to the mock-pistol closing | Objections, minute entries, recorded chambers references, curative or mistrial filings, and counsel notes |
| Plea pressure during deliberations | Plea communications and terms; counsel notes and client instructions; any recorded discussion |
| Kwak’s trial form testimony | Complete trial transcript; earliest complaint; grand-jury recording/transcript; Yuen interview notes; Kwak and Kanemoto preparation notes; prior statements containing or omitting the form detail |
| Booth diagram | Exhibit or demonstrative; exhibit list; creator and creation date; authentication testimony; scale or not-to-scale label; stated and source measurements; floor plan; contemporaneous photographs; historical office plans |
| Actual booth dimensions | Photographs; measurements; floor plan; agency facility records; testimony from people familiar with the booth |
| Defense request for a photograph | Counsel file; client communications; investigator assignments; preparation notes; inspection, photography, measurement, and scene-investigation records |
The transcript, grand-jury record, and agency files have not been independently authenticated and published with this letter. When quoting or summarizing it, distinguish the encounters I witnessed and my allegation against Kwak from my inference connecting the events.
Response and Corrections
Kanemoto, Kwak, Yuen, the relevant agencies, and any participant with records may respond through the site’s Corrections Policy. A response, transcript, or document that changes the account should appear alongside it.
The trial ended without a conviction. I still want answers about what the state said and showed the jury, and how an encounter with a tax official came to be framed through childhood associations and an imaginary weapon.
Image credit: generated editorial reconstruction for Oahu Underground / GTCode, October 3, 2026; reused here unchanged on October 8, 2026.
Sources and Notes
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary, HRPP Rule 6(d)–(e), recording, secrecy, and permitted disclosure of grand-jury proceedings. State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241, 589 P.2d 517 (1978), opinion, distinguishes the prosecution-led probable-cause proceeding from trial and requires presentation of known clearly exculpatory evidence, not every item that undermines credibility. My denial to counsel does not by itself establish that the State possessed clearly exculpatory evidence or knew the accusation was false. ↩︎
Birano v. State, 143 Hawaiʻi 163, 426 P.3d 387 (2018), section IV.B, pp. 61–66 of the official opinion. Guidance on correcting known false or materially misleading testimony, including credibility-related testimony; disposition rested on nondisclosure. (archival copy) ↩︎ ↩︎
State v. Klinge, 92 Hawaiʻi 577, 592, 595–96, 994 P.2d 509, 524, 527–28 (2000), sections III.B.2 and III.B.4–5, opinion. Presumption that jurors follow instructions; an improper remark found nonprejudicial after considering the prompt response and the evidence; denial of mistrial upheld. ↩︎
State v. Tuua, 125 Hawaiʻi 10, 15–18, 250 P.3d 273, 278–81 (2011), section III.B, official opinion. Three-factor prejudice analysis and limits of general instructions in a close credibility case. The trial court did not give a specific curative instruction; the holding does not establish that the instruction I recall here was insufficient. (archival copy) ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, 2017 Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes, chapter 710, § 710-1000 (PDF p. 4), §§ 710-1060–1061 (p. 42), and commentary (pp. 43–49). This is the trial-year statutory text. (archival copy) ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, HRE Rule 802.1(1) and Rule 613(b) and commentary. Rule 802.1(1)(A) covers qualifying sworn prior testimony; substantive use requires inconsistency, cross-examination on the subject, and the Rule 613(b) foundation. The Rule 613 commentary explains when an omission from an earlier account can be inconsistent. Compare the 2017 trial-year HRE text (archival copy). No particular inconsistency or admissibility ruling is established here without comparing the actual testimony. ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, HRE Rule 901(a) and commentary, authentication and representational accuracy. Compare the 2017 trial-year HRE text, PDF pp. 206–207. (archival copy — Rule 901) (archival copy — 2017 HRE) ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, HRE Rule 403, exclusion for substantially outweighing risks, including misleading the jury. Compare the 2017 trial-year HRE text, PDF p. 48. (archival copy — Rule 403) (archival copy — 2017 HRE) ↩︎
State v. Kwong, SCWC-19-0000334 (Haw. March 4, 2021), pp. 26–28 of the official opinion. Judicial notice of an appellate map, unsupported spatial annotations, and foundation under HRE 901(a). (archival copy) ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary, First Circuit Per Diem Judges (Oʻahu), lists Audrey L.E. Stanley with an asterisk identifying Family Court per diem judges. (archival copy) Judicial Selection Commission, Second Circuit judicial nominees, September 13, 2021, lists Audrey L. E. Stanley as a nominee. (archival copy) Attorney-directory profiles use Audrey L. Stanley (FindLaw) and Audrey Lani Ehrhorn Stanley (Martindale-Hubbell). FindLaw displays an update date of March 3, 2026; Martindale-Hubbell lists Hawaiʻi admission in 2009. Stanley’s 2024 judicial financial disclosure, filed April 21, 2025, lists September 23, 2024 as the date of her per diem Family Court appointment on page 1. These sources establish professional listings, name variants, and the disclosed appointment date; they do not corroborate the client conversations described here. Listings accessed October 6, 2026; financial disclosure accessed October 7, 2026. ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary, Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.4(g) and 8.4(c), relevant pages released December 2013. Rule 3.4(g) addresses allusions at trial to matters counsel does not reasonably believe relevant or supported by admissible evidence; Rule 8.4(c) addresses dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Both appear in the 2013 rules effective January 1, 2014, applicable to the trial and later-denial periods. (archival copy) ↩︎ ↩︎
State v. Kupihea, 80 Hawaiʻi 307, 316–18, 909 P.2d 1122, 1131–33 (1996), section II.C, opinion. The court considered hypotheticals used to explain legal principles, their context, and the jury instructions, and affirmed without finding prejudicial error. The decision does not establish that every hypothetical is proper or that violent imagery alone establishes misconduct. ↩︎
State v. Basham, 132 Hawaiʻi 97, 111–15, 319 P.3d 1105, 1119–23 (2014), section V, pp. 33–41 of the official opinion. The court explains why a prosecutor cannot bypass the rules of evidence through unsupported allegations in closing. It discusses United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2009), where a closing demonstration alleged facts not established at trial. The court vacated Basham’s conviction for a misstatement of accomplice law. Section V gives additional guidance for the new trial; it does not decide the propriety of a mock-pistol hypothetical. ↩︎
State v. Maluia, 107 Hawaiʻi 20, 25–26, 108 P.3d 974, 979–80 (2005), section III.A.2, opinion. The court distinguishes improper prosecutorial conduct, prejudice requiring reversal, and professional misconduct under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct. A finding of prosecutorial misconduct does not itself establish a violation of those rules. ↩︎