A public accountability letter by Ekewaka Lono.
Related open investigation: This event is one component of the ongoing 2015–2022 sequence analysis. See The Information Trail: Open Questions from 2015–2022.
Audrey L.E. Stanley1 was my assigned public defender when I reported the Hartmann death threat. She dismissed my report and later relayed a tentative proposal involving my departure from Hawaiʻi.
A Death Threat During My Defense Investigation
I knew the Hartmanns through the Haleʻiwa duplex where I rented the back unit. They occupied the front unit.
The threat occurred after February 2016 and before the July 2017 trial. I was under indictment and investigating matters for my defense. I intended to testify about what I uncovered, and Gene Hartmann knew of the indictment and investigation. During an in-person social encounter, Gene and Rita threatened me with death. They delivered the words calmly and quietly:
Gene: “Stay away from [name withheld].”
Rita: “Or you will get whacked.”
In context, I understood the warning to target my defense investigation and disclosure. “Stay away” was the instruction; “whacked” was the threatened consequence.
The name in the quotation is withheld. I understood it to refer to a public figure. The allegation concerns what Gene and Rita Hartmann said to me. Their use of the name does not establish that the person issued, authorized, knew of, or participated in the threat.
The following day, Gene reframed the discussion as a “murder mystery.” I told him I would tell everyone. I understood him to be recasting the threat as a harmless conversation.
The housing, room-inquiry, and private-message history appears in Before the Tax Office. It explains how these people and conversations entered my life. It does not turn a room applicant, a reference, a relative, or a public figure into a participant in the threat.
The Legal Questions
Hawaiʻi law raises two questions about that account. HRS §710-1071 addresses threats directed at a witness or someone the speaker believes is about to be called as a witness, with intent to influence testimony. Section 707-764(2) concerns intentionally using specified threats to make someone stop conduct they have a legal right to pursue. Threatened future bodily injury is one of those means. These provisions were in force during the threat period.23
The witness-intimidation question requires evidence of what each speaker understood about my expected testimony and what the warning was intended to accomplish. My intention to testify and Gene’s knowledge of the case and investigation are part of my account. They do not, by themselves, establish either speaker’s understanding of my prospective testimony. State v. Pudiquet shows how circumstances can supply evidence of that belief and intent. State v. Alston distinguishes the intent elements of witness intimidation and terroristic threatening.4
The extortion question concerns whether the warning was used to make me abandon lawful investigation or disclosure I was pursuing in connection with my defense. It does not depend on prospective-witness status. The surrounding conversation, each speaker’s intent, my legal right to pursue the conduct, and whether the warning compelled or induced me to stop it still need examination.5 No criminal adjudication of the Hartmann conduct is reported here.
What Stanley Heard From Me
I reported the threat to Stanley while she was representing me. I began explaining who had spoken, the condition attached to the warning, and why I took it seriously. She interrupted and dismissed the report, in substance, as “no big deal.” She did not explain how the report would be documented or addressed, how it would affect preparation for my testimony, or what reporting or protective options were available. She also called the Hartmann warning a “conditional death threat.”
Separately, while we reviewed the grand-jury transcript, Stanley laughed at its account of my distress during the tax-office encounter. I was under indictment over that encounter.
The Leave-Hawaiʻi Communication
Not long after that report, Stanley told me there might be a way to resolve the case if I left Hawaiʻi. She presented it as a tentative idea.
She made clear that the idea was not hers and came from the prosecution. I cannot identify the specific person who originated it. I received no written proposal. Her explanation did not let me distinguish a formal offer from an informal discussion or an idea that had not become an offer.
Rule 1.4(b) required enough explanation for an informed decision about the representation. If Stanley received a proffered plea bargain, Rule 1.4(a)(6) also required prompt communication.6 Missouri v. Frye becomes relevant if the communication was a formal prosecution plea offer.7 Any correspondence, notes, and testimony could establish who within the prosecution proposed departure, how the idea reached Stanley, what leaving required, what would happen to the case, and what advice she gave about accepting or refusing.
Pressure to Leave
The Hartmanns separately told me to go away or leave. The concept Stanley relayed from the prosecution also involved leaving Hawaiʻi. Both communications pressed me toward departure. I did not observe coordination between her and the Hartmanns, and I cannot identify the specific person who originated the concept.
Leaving Hawaiʻi would not address the death threat or its effect on my defense investigation and intended testimony. I brought the report to appointed counsel. The next possible resolution she described centered on my departure, without an explanation of how she had handled the report.
The Wider Pressure Before Trial
In November 2015, James Yuen stood beside a man identified to me as a New Jersey State Police organized-crime investigator when that man invoked my childhood associates and told me he would give me a “colonoscopy.” I understood it as a threat of invasive investigation and use of my past against me. Before the Tax Office gives the encounter and the records needed to establish the investigator’s identity and assignment.
In May or June 2017, shortly before trial, “Kevin” threatened career destruction if I continued talking about the Hartmann episode and related conduct. He approached me outside Kahala Whole Foods and invoked a prominent technology investor’s name. His use of the name does not establish the investor’s direction, approval, or prior knowledge. The chronology records his description of his associations and what he said.
That warning pressured me to stop disclosing what had happened before trial. I do not claim Stanley knew of the Whole Foods encounter.
What the Representation Required
Hawaiʻi’s professional-conduct rules require competent representation under Rule 1.1, diligence under Rule 1.3, and communication sufficient for informed client decisions under Rule 1.4.6 They required her to assess information bearing on my defense, investigate where appropriate, and give me enough explanation to make informed decisions.
In State v. Aplaca, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court explained that an informed decision about prospective defense witnesses requires adequate inquiry into the underlying facts. State v. Tetu explains the broader right to reasonable defense investigation.8 These authorities support examining the basis for counsel’s decision here. The threat’s relevance to the defense and the appropriate scope of investigation remain questions for the file and the participants.
HRS §802-7 provides for investigatory and other services necessary for an adequate defense, including payment or authorization by the Public Defender under the statute’s conditions.9 Was the threat evaluated for defense relevance, and was any investigative assistance considered or used?
I do not claim she had an automatic duty to report the speakers to police. No adjudicated violation is reported here.
A conflict claim would require evidence of an interest that limited her representation and how it affected her work. Her employment, later judicial service, or social connections do not establish that by themselves.
A Separate Courtroom Issue
Kanemoto’s later mock-pistol closing argument is addressed in The Hypothetical Gun. Retained Trial Counsel’s response to that event, the chambers conference, and the plea pressure during deliberations are addressed in The Defense Table Went Quiet.
I testified at the July 2017 trial, but did not testify about the Hartmann threat. Retained Trial Counsel’s advice about that omission belongs in his representation file.
A Later Attempt to Report the Same Threat
After 2022, I again attempted to report the Hartmann threat to HPD. Officer Brandt prevented another officer from receiving it. Before the Tax Office gives the later intake event and the police records needed to examine it.
The Record and the Public Responsibility
| Issue | Evidence and status |
|---|---|
| Hartmann words and following-day reframing | My firsthand account; contemporaneous messages, notes, and witnesses are corroboration paths |
| What each speaker knew about the prosecution, investigation, and expected testimony | My account identifies Gene’s knowledge of the case and investigation; prior conversations, messages, and witnesses could establish each speaker’s understanding and intent |
| What “stay away” meant in context | I understood it as an instruction to stop defense investigation and disclosure; the surrounding conversation and contemporaneous accounts could test that understanding and the legal right to pursue the conduct |
| Grand-jury transcript review | My firsthand account of Stanley laughing at the description of my distress; the transcript identifies the material, while communications, notes, and testimony could test the interaction and establish when the review occurred relative to my report |
| Report to Stanley and dismissive response | She called the warning a “conditional death threat” and interrupted and dismissed my report; counsel notes, contact logs, supervisor records, and testimony could test the conversations and establish how the report was handled |
| Assessment, advice, and investigative assistance | Counsel notes, client communications, consultations, referrals, and investigator assignments could establish what Stanley assessed and explained and whether further inquiry was considered or undertaken |
| Leave-Hawaiʻi concept and prosecution source | Stanley made clear that it came from the prosecution; any correspondence, terms, notes, and testimony could help establish the specific originator, what it required, and how she explained it |
| Pressure to leave | The Hartmanns’ separate departure suggestion and the departure concept Stanley relayed, both in my firsthand account; coordination unobserved |
| Later career warning | My firsthand account; not represented as a report Stanley received |
| Later HPD attempt to report the Hartmann threat | My firsthand account; CAD/dispatch, officer assignments, intake records, notes, retained bodycam, supervisor and complaint records are retrieval paths |
The institutional files have not been independently authenticated and published with this letter. They could corroborate or contradict my account and establish actions I did not observe. Notes documenting action outside my presence would qualify the account of institutional handling. Evidence about the speakers’ understanding of prospective testimony bears on witness intimidation; the separate question of coercion against lawful conduct remains to be tested on its own elements.
The Judiciary lists Stanley as a First Circuit per diem judge. Her 2024 judicial financial disclosure gives September 23, 2024 as the date of her Family Court appointment.1 She was my public defender when I reported the threat. Her later judicial service adds to the present public interest in examining that representation. This letter makes no claim about her conduct on the bench or the judicial appointment process.
Response and Corrections
Stanley, the Office of the Public Defender, and any participant with records may respond through the site’s Corrections Policy. Relevant notes, terms, or explanations should be incorporated with their source identified.
I am asking Stanley to account for how she handled my report, what advice she gave me, and what she was communicating when she raised departure.
The header image is generated editorial artwork and contains no documentary image from the threat or conversation. Image credit: generated editorial artwork for Oahu Underground / GTCode, October 1, 2026.
Sources and Notes
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary, First Circuit Per Diem Judges (Oʻahu), lists Audrey L.E. Stanley with an asterisk identifying Family Court per diem judges. (archival copy) Judicial Selection Commission, Second Circuit judicial nominees, September 13, 2021, lists Audrey L. E. Stanley as a nominee. (archival copy) Attorney-directory profiles use Audrey L. Stanley (FindLaw) and Audrey Lani Ehrhorn Stanley (Martindale-Hubbell). FindLaw displays an update date of March 3, 2026; Martindale-Hubbell lists Hawaiʻi admission in 2009. Stanley’s 2024 judicial financial disclosure, filed April 21, 2025, lists September 23, 2024 as the date of her per diem Family Court appointment on page 1. These sources establish professional listings, name variants, and the disclosed appointment date; they do not corroborate the client conversations described here. Listings accessed October 6, 2026; financial disclosure accessed October 7, 2026. ↩︎ ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, 2017 HRS chapter 710, §§710-1071–1072, PDF pp. 60–61 (archival copy); 2017 HRS chapter 707, §707-764(1)(a) and (2), PDF pp. 102–103, and §707-766(1)(b)–(2), pp. 103–104. Witness intimidation and extortion under §707-764(2) are classified as class C felonies. Section 710-1072 separately defines misdemeanor witness tampering; its commentary distinguishes persuasion or trickery from intimidation. These classifications describe the law, not findings against Gene and Rita Hartmann. ↩︎
Historical limit: Act 137, Session Laws of Hawaiʻi 2023, approved June 29, 2023, added the broad force, threat, coercion, fraud, and deception provision to HRS §710-1072.5. Section 2 preserves rights, duties, penalties, and proceedings arising before the effective date. The earlier 2017 chapter 710 text addressed an immunized witness’s refusal to testify. The 2023 provision is not applied to the pretrial Hartmann conduct in this article. ↩︎
State v. Pudiquet, 82 Hawaiʻi 419, 922 P.2d 1032 (ICA 1996), opinion, section II.A.2, examining threats, prospective-witness belief, and intent from the circumstances. State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 865 P.2d 157 (1994), opinion, section II.B, distinguishes the intent to affect a witness’s participation from the intent to terrorize or reckless disregard of that risk. The judicial-process rationale is also addressed in the §710-1071 commentary and Pudiquet. ↩︎
Section 707-764(2) requires actual compulsion or inducement. In State v. Pineda, 70 Haw. 245, 251, 768 P.2d 239, 242 (1989), the victim’s agreement to withdraw a complaint after threats was sufficient, although he later changed his mind and continued with it. Opinion, section II. If the threat did not compel or induce the relevant conduct or abstention, completed extortion presents a different question; any attempt liability requires separate analysis. ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary, Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), and 1.4 (Communication). In the archived compilation, HRPC–7 bears a December 2013 release date; HRPC–10–12 bear December 2015 release dates. The compilation also contains later amendments. Rule 1.4(a)(6) addresses a received written civil settlement offer or a proffered criminal plea bargain; Rule 1.4(b) addresses explanation sufficient for informed decisions. Comments provide interpretive guidance rather than independent binding rules. ↩︎ ↩︎
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), U.S. Supreme Court opinion, section II.B, recognizing a general duty to communicate favorable formal prosecution plea offers. It does not establish a particular documentation requirement for every informal concept or a constitutional right to identify the proposal’s ultimate originator. Rule 1.4(b) supplies the broader explanation standard discussed here. The form of Stanley’s communication and any underlying offer remain unresolved; no constitutional finding is reported. ↩︎
State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 837 P.2d 1298 (1992), opinion, section III.A, concerning inadequate pretrial investigation of potential defense witnesses and the inquiry needed for an informed tactical decision. State v. Tetu, No. SCWC-13-0003062 (Haw. Dec. 5, 2016), opinion, section III.A.2(a), discusses the broader right to reasonable defense investigation. The precise date of Stanley’s response is unresolved; Tetu is cited as an explanation of that right, not as a decision necessarily issued before her response. Neither case supplies a finding about Stanley or a categorical requirement to investigate the Hartmanns. ↩︎
Hawaiʻi State Legislature, HRS §802-7, Litigation expenses. The statute’s amendment history predates the representation period. The funding mechanism depends on inability to pay and necessity for an adequate defense; its existence does not establish what assistance was available or required in this case. ↩︎